The Value of Imprecise Prediction by Elliott-Graves, Alkistis
Alkistis Elliott-Graves  
University of Helsinki (TINT)  
alkistis.elliott-graves@helsinki.fi  
 
 
 
 
 
The Value of Imprecise Prediction  
 
(Penultimate version – forthcoming in Philosophy Theory and Practice in Biology) 
 
Abstract 
 
The traditional philosophy of science approach to prediction leaves little room 
for appreciating the value and potential of imprecise predictions. At best, they 
are considered a stepping stone to more precise predictions, while at worst they 
are viewed as detracting from the scientific quality of a discipline. The aim of 
this paper is to show that imprecise predictions are undervalued in philosophy 
of science. I review the conceptions of imprecise predictions, and the main 
criticisms levelled against them: (i) that they cannot aid in model selection and 
improvement and (ii) that they cannot support effective interventions in 
practical decision making. I will argue against both criticisms, showing that 
imprecise predictions have a circumscribed but important and legitimate place 
in the study of complex heterogeneous systems. The argument is illustrated and 
supported by an example from conservation biology, where imprecise models 
were instrumental in saving the kōkako from extinction.  
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1.   Introduction 
 
 Prediction is important because it constitutes a fundamental facet of scientific practice, 
and an integral feature of the evaluation of scientific theories across many scientific disciplines. 
However, the notion of prediction in philosophy of science and scientific practice is defined 
quite narrowly; useful predictions are precise, risky and novel (Hitchcock and Sober 2004; 
Lipton 2008; Barrett and Stanford 2006). These characteristics are thought to be crucial when 
predictions are used to test or confirm theories, their traditional role in philosophy of science 
(Douglas and Magnus 2013; Lipton 2008; Douglas 2009). Predictions that lack these 
characteristics consequently receive much less attention, and predominantly negative at that.  
 One such group are imprecise predictions.1 These are predictions of the existence of a 
phenomenon, effect or change, without a precise specification of its extent or magnitude. They 
can take the form of trends, ranges or imprecisely probabilistic statements. They occur in a 
number of sciences, especially those that investigate complex, heterogeneous systems, such as 
economics and ecology and climate science. For example, imprecise predictions in economics 
are usually described as predictions of the existence of a phenomenon, process, or entity, that 
do not include any additional specific detail. They “identify the direction in which changes 
move, without however, identifying the magnitude of these directions” (Rosenberg 1989). A 
standard example of an imprecise predictive statement in economics is: ‘an increase in tax rate 
will decrease the firm’s output’ (without specification of how much the output will decrease) 
(Rosenberg 1989, 53). In ecology, imprecise predictions are the outputs of mathematical 
models, such as optimality models, loop analysis and fuzzy interaction webs (Justus 2006; 
Dambacher, Li, and Rossignol 2003; Ramsey et al. 2012; Levins 1974; Puccia and Levins 
1986). The predictions are trends (i.e. the population will increase/decrease given x, y, z) or 
ranges (the population will increase by more than x%; the population will decrease by between 
y and z%).  Climate scientists use models to make imprecise predictions about climate 
variables, such as temperature or precipitation. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
                                               
1Sometimes, imprecise predictions are referred to as ‘generic’ (e.g. in economics, see Rosenberg 1989) or 
‘qualitative’ (e.g. in economics and ecology, see Orzack & Sober 1993, Gonzalez 2015, Dambacher et al., 2003). 
As we shall see, many of these terms are quite loaded. The most important of these implications is that they tend 
to be viewed dichotomously and one side of the dichotomy is thought to lack certain other characteristics (e.g. 
mathematics). In order to avoid these semantic quibbles, I will be using the term ‘imprecise’ to refer to predictions 
that have a certain level of imprecision (though in the spirit of accurate representation, I will retain the other 
terminology when outlining existing accounts).  
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Climate Change (IPCC)’s fifth report (2013) included the prediction that it is likely (i.e. 60%-
100% chance) that by 2100 the mean global temperature would rise by between 2.67 - 4.87 Co.  
 The prevailing attitude towards imprecise predictions is to ignore, dismiss or criticize 
them. Philosophers have tended to view them as mathematically unsound, opaque and 
untrustworthy. For example, in a recent book on economic predictions, Gonzales (2015) 
defines imprecise predictions as follows: 
“1) The predictions do not follow, in principle, clear rules, because they commonly rely on an 
intuitive point of view; 2) the subjects … state the future events based on their own experience; 3) 
the prediction does not detail explicitly how the available information is incorporated into 
prediction” (p. 58) 
 
At best, they are seen as a preliminary step, to be further refined by more precise quantitative 
approaches. A famous example of this position comes from Rosenberg’s attack of generic 
predictions in economics:  
“Generic predictions are predictions of the existence of a phenomenon, process, or entity, as opposed 
to specific predictions about its detailed character … This lack of specificity is a weakness in generic 
theories. … Generic prediction is something, it is a start, but it is not enough. And economists should 
not be satisfied with it.” (1989, pp. 53-55)  
Similarly, Orzack and Sober (1993), criticized imprecise (here termed ‘qualitative’) models in 
ecology as “not mathematical” (p. 538), while “the idea of qualitative modeling has hindered 
the development of an unbiased assessment of the truth” (p. 543). They argued that grounds 
for accepting qualitative predictions are often left unstated and thus inherently suspect:  
 
“The most important defect in qualitative testing … is that it fails to allow one to answer the most 
important question about a particular model: How well does that model explain the data? Qualitative 
testing may show some models are incompatible with data, but only quantitative testing of 
quantitative models can determine what one if any sufficiently explains the data.” (p. 542) 
 
For many scientists, reliance on imprecise predictions is seen as a cause of discord within 
a discipline, or even contributing to the demarcation of a field as ‘soft’ or ‘unscientific’ (Peters 
1991; Valéry, Fritz, and Lefeuvre 2013; Lipsey 2001; Houlahan et al. 2017; discussion in 
Winther 2011). For example, Houlahan et al. (2017) criticize their own field (ecology) as not 
being sufficiently scientific, because it does not pay enough attention to quantitative prediction:  
“The lack of emphasis on prediction has resulted in a discipline that tests qualitative, imprecise 
hypotheses with little concern for whether the results are generalizable beyond where and when the 
data were collected.” (p. 1)2 
 
They add that:   
“A new commitment to prediction in ecology would lead to, … more mature (i.e. quantitative) 
hypotheses, prioritization of modeling techniques that are more appropriate for prediction … and, 
ultimately, advancement towards a more general understanding of the natural world. (p. 1) 
                                               
2 I should note that here, ‘hypothesis’ refers to outputs of models and experiments, hence it is synonymous with 
‘prediction’.  
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 A less extreme version of this view is echoed implicitly, when scientists argue that a 
particular science needs to improve its predictive power and suggesting that this can be 
achieved by increasing the precision of its predictions (Colander et al. 2009; Gurevitch et al. 
2011; Hayes and Barry 2007; Evans, Norris, and Benton 2012; Kolar and Lodge 2002). Further 
evidence of implicit distrust comes from the small number of papers that explicitly advocate 
the use of models that yield imprecise predictions, and from the ways in which scientists 
express themselves when they do use them. In many cases, the tone of a paper that produces 
imprecise predictions is apologetic, highlighting the novelty of the concept or theory being 
used, or the immature state of the science (see for example Loiselle et al. 2000). 
 The aim of this paper is to defend a certain subset of imprecise predictions. I start by 
examining the existing conceptions of imprecise predictions (including qualitative and generic) 
and classify them in terms of their level of precision (section 2). I then outline the two main 
criticisms that can be levelled against them: (i) that they are insufficiently risky and therefore 
cannot be used in model selection or improvement and (ii) that they do not support effective 
interventions in practical decision making (section 3). In section 4, I defend imprecise 
predictions by showing both that they can be risky and effectively support interventions. In 
section 5, I will examine a residual concern, namely that imprecise predictions are only useful 
in a very specific, non-ideal set of circumstances, hence it is still better to aim for precision in 
our predictions, whenever possible. I will argue, following Levins (1966), that the reasons we 
cannot reach this ideal lie in the systems themselves, rather than the methods scientists use to 
investigate them. Thus, imprecise predictions have a limited but important role in scientific 
practice.  
 
2.   Defining Imprecise Predictions 
  
 Defining imprecise predictions is not straightforward. In fields such as Business, 
Management and some social sciences, imprecise predictions are the results of qualitative 
research methods such as interviews, questionnaires and the construction of narratives, i.e. 
methods that do not involve quantification (Patton 2014). Here, predictions are interpretations 
of this information by experts. Experts gather all the information they deem relevant and make 
an ‘educated guess’ about the existence of a phenomenon in the future, or the direction in which 
it will change. Examples include the extrapolation of case studies from one area to another, 
such as the prediction (by experts) that the programme for improving infant nutrition in Tamil 
Nadu by educating mothers would also improve infant nutrition in Bangladesh (Cartwright 
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2012).3 As these are cases where there is no discernible and systematic method that gives rise 
to the prediction this is one category of imprecise predictions I will not be defending. Instead, 
I am interested in imprecise predictions that appear in predominantly quantitative disciplines, 
such as ecology, economics and climate change (see examples in Introduction). These 
predictions are the outputs of mathematical models, hence imprecise model predictions. They 
deserve to be defended because they are seen as being in direct competition with highly precise 
predictions and come off much worse, as they are tarred with the same brush as the ‘expert 
intuition’ predictions mentioned above.  
 In order to define imprecise predictions, we must first take a closer look at the notion of 
precision, a notion that is itself a notoriously difficult concept to define, as it also is used in a 
number of different ways (Matthewson and Weisberg 2009). First, precision in a model can 
refer to the parameters in the model (parameter precision) or the output of the model (output 
precision) (Matthewson and Weisberg 2009). In the context of imprecise model predictions, 
the output of the model is the most relevant, as predictions are the outputs of models. Yet there 
are links between parameter and output precision, namely that imprecise specifications of 
parameters tend to produce imprecisely specified outputs. Of course, this is not always the 
case; it is possible for models with finely specified parameters to produce imprecise predictions 
(e.g. interval rather than point predictions, or families of models that produce precise but 
different outputs, that are expressed imprecisely when amalgamated). Nonetheless, as 
parameter imprecision can affect output imprecision, we are interested in the former insofar as 
it affects the latter. 
 Second, is precision dichotomous or a matter of degree? Orzack and Sober in their 1993 
criticism of Levins, seem to suggest that it is dichotomous, as they define a model as precise if 
it ‘generates point predictions for output parameters’ and imprecise if it does not (p. 534). 
However, I think it is much more useful to think of precision as a matter of degree. Predicting 
that an effect will increase rather than decrease is less precise than predicting that it will 
increase by more than 3%, which is in turn less precise than predicting that it will increase by 
3.528%.  
 Third, why are a number of models imprecise? We can think of imprecision as a way of 
representing uncertainty in our models. In general terms, uncertainty refers to an epistemic 
limitation i.e. lack of knowledge about the accuracy of a claim or method. Uncertainty in 
                                               
3  In this case, the prediction failed, because the experts did not consider the relevant differences between Tamil 
Nadu and Bangladesh, such as the fact that educating mothers would not cause a shift in practice in Bangladesh, 
because they do not have control over shopping or food distribution within the household.  
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models can pertain to model inputs, i.e. uncertainty about the types of parameters that should 
be included in the model and/or uncertainty about the values these parameters should take 
(Parker 2010, Parker & Risbey 2015). Often, parameter imprecision is inversely related to 
uncertainty as parameters in a model are defined more precisely as our uncertainty about them 
decreases (Matthewson & Weisberg, 2009).4 More importantly, uncertainty can refer to model 
outputs. Here, output imprecision is a reflection of our uncertainty regarding the effect we are 
predicting (Smith and Stern 2011; Regan, Colyvan, and Burgman 2002; Parker 2010). This 
uncertainty can be expressed in a number of ways, the most common of which are: (i) 
imprecision in terms of the magnitude of the effect we are predicting, which can take the form 
of interval probability predictions, range predictions or predictions of trends and (ii) qualitative 
indications of confidence levels in the accuracy of the prediction in question (Parker & Risbey 
2015).  
 In fact, according to Parker & Risbey (2015), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC)’s classification of uncertainty reports can be understood in terms of how 
precise they are (pp 2-3):  
 
(a)   gives a full probability density function/probability distribution over values 
of X  
 
(b)   gives a range of values of X in which the future value can be expected to 
fall with a precisely specified probability, such as 0.95  
 
(c)   gives a range of values of X in which the future value can be expected to 
fall with an imprecise or interval probability, such as 0.6–0.9, or with a 
qualitative level of confidence, e.g. medium 
 
(d)   gives a range of values of X that can be considered plausible but indicates 
that probabilities cannot be assigned  
 
(e)   gives an order of magnitude estimate of the future value of X but indicates 
that more precise estimates are out of reach  
 
(f)   indicates that the future value of X will be greater than (or less than) the 
current value, though by how much is unclear 
 
(g)   admits that almost nothing is known about the future value of X 
                                               
4 Consider, for example the exponential growth model, described by the equation dN/dt = rN. This equation 
describes how a population N grows if it is affected only by the intrinsic growth rate r. The value of r is different 
for each population, and it is calculated from data on birth rates, death rates and fecundity. However, this data is 
often patchy or incomplete, so scientists might not be certain about the precise value of r. Thus, a complete set of 
data will allow scientists to express r precisely to many decimal points, e.g. 1.35862, whereas patchier data sets 
will be expressed less precisely, e.g. as (1.30 ± 0.01) where r ranges from 1.29 to 1.31. In cases of higher 
uncertainty, r can be expressed as (1.3 ± 0.1), i.e. the range from 1.2 to 1.4, and so on.  
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 This list is a classification of output uncertainty in decreasing levels of precision, i.e. the 
more uncertain we are about our model outputs, the more imprecise their values. The first point 
to note is that it shows that a dichotomous notion of precision is unlikely to be useful for 
predictions under conditions of uncertainty. If precision were dichotomous, then where would 
the cut-off be? Does the inclusion of probability automatically make a prediction imprecise? 
Even if it does, this does not mean that all non-precise predictions are equally imprecise. After 
all, of the main advantages of introducing probabilities into prediction is so that we can 
differentiate between different levels of imprecision.  
 Examining the list itself, how does each level relate to imprecise predictions? Starting at 
the bottom, (g) can be excluded because it does not involve prediction, imprecise or otherwise. 
Moving up, (f) is probably the most uncontroversial way to characterize an imprecise 
prediction. It tells about the quality of the change (more or less, plus or minus, greater or lesser) 
but nothing about the quantity of the change. An example could be: average global temperature 
will increase in the next 10 years. The next level (e) is more precise, but only slightly. There is 
still no quantitative information about the change, just a more precise qualitative modifier. For 
example, the average global temperature will increase more over the next 10 years than in the 
last 10 years.  
 Similarly for (d), even though X is expressed in terms of a range of numerical values, there 
is no quantification of uncertainty. We might be able to give a qualitative statement of our 
expectation for X coming about, e.g. low, medium, high, but this type of statement is not 
probabilistic. In fact, this type of statement can be distinguished from a confidence interval (as 
in level c), where the qualitative statement is attached to an (imprecise) probability. Here, the 
qualitative statement is less precise as it refers to the effect itself, rather than our confidence in 
the probabilistic estimate of the effect. In addition,  it may only make sense within a particular 
context, for example, the statement “the effect of the rat population on the possum population 
is low” might be accurate in one context (i.e. the rat, possum, kōkako (a type of bird) 
community in the North Island of New Zealand) but may not be accurate in other contexts, 
such as the effect of an invasive plant species on a community in Australia, where a similar 
effect (in terms of reduction of population size) may be considered moderate, or even high in 
that context.   
 So far, this classification corresponds to scientists’ own classifications: levels (e) and (f) 
correspond to what many economists count as generic predictions. For example, IS-LM 
models, that are historically perhaps the most influential macroeconomic models, are highly 
imprecise. They represent the demand side of the economy with two equations referring to the 
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real sector (investment & saving) and the monetary sector (liquidity preference & monetary 
supply) and can be used to make predictions about the effect of fiscal and monetary policies 
on the equilibrium level of income (increase/decrease) (Vercelli 2000).  
 Level (d) is best exemplified by a subset of imprecise predictions in ecology (most others 
correspond to c). An important example of (d) is loop analysis (Dambacher, Li, and Rossignol 
2003; Justus 2005; Levins 1974; Puccia and Levins 1986). Here, ecologists use signed directed 
graphs to represent interactions between populations in a community. The graph (and 
associated community matrix) can be used to identify the quality of the effect (positive (1), 
neutral (0), negative (-1)) of each population on the others and to predict the effects of 
perturbations of the system, taking into account dynamic qualities of the system such as 
feedback. For example, in a community of plants, kōkako, rats, possums and stoats, loop 
analysis can be used to determine all the interactions between each population in the 
community (see figure 1A) (Ramsey and Veltman 2005). Scientists can use the conjunction of 
qualitative effects to determine which predator population should be the focus of an 
intervention so that the prey population is saved from extinction. In this example, loop analysis 
predicted that an increase in all predator populations would have a negative effect on the 
kōkako population, but that an increase in the rat population would have a stronger effect than 
the other two predators, because it would result in a net total of two negative feedback cycles 
(one from predation and one from competition) (see figure 1B). 
 
Figure 1. Loop Analysis  
 
  
Signed digraph of the kōkako food web (A) and predictions from the adjoint of the qualitative matrix (°A) of interactions from the 
kokako food web (B). (A) Arrows represent positive causal links and closed circles represent negative causal links. Closed circles 
starting and ending at the same variable represent self-damping (density-dependent) effects. (B) Values are the net number of 
feedback cycles (positive and negative) contributing to the response in species i (rows) resulting from a sustained positive input 
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LOOP  ANALYSIS
 
This approach closely follows Dambacher 
 
et al
 
. (2002)
and Puccia & Levins (1985) in their analysis of quali-
tatively specified community matrices using loop analysis.
Loop analysis is concerned primarily with predicting
whether variables increase, decrease or remain unchanged,
rather than specifying by how much. In addition, loop
analysis can also predict the overall stability of the sys-
tem (Puccia & Levins 1985). As an example, consider
the signed digraph
where species 2 is a predator and species 1 is the prey.
The line ending in an arrowhead signifies that species 1
has an enhancing effect on species 2 while the line end-
ing with a closed circle indicates that species 2 has a
negative effect on species 1. The line with the closed cir-
cle starting and ending at species 2 indicates that spe-
cies 2 negati ely affects itself. This is us d commonly to
represent a self-damping or density-dependent effect
or can b  used to indicate that the variable is also influ-
enced by other variables not represented in the model
(Puccia & Levins 1985). Loop analysis makes predic-
tions about the effect of perturbations based upon the
feedb ck cycles present in the signed digr ph. A ycle i
defined as the product of paths of direct links starting
at one variable and ending at another without visiting
any variable twice. Any cycle produces feedback, either
positive or negative, and can be of different lengths,
representing different levels of feedback. The direction
of change in the equilibrium abundance of species 
 
j
 
 due
to a sustained perturbation in species 
 
i
 
 is given by the
summation of positive and negative cycles, both
directly and indirectly affecting species 
 
i
 
 and 
 
j.
 
 Ambi-
guity in the response of the predictions enters when
there is countervailing feedback cycles contributing to
a particular response. For example, if  there are five neg-
ative feedback cycles and five positive feedback cycles
acting on the response between variables 
 
i
 
 and 
 
j
 
 then
the predicted response of variable 
 
j
 
 to a perturbation of
variable 
 
i
 
 is completely ambiguous and the actual
response would be dependent upon the strength of the
component interactions. Due to the complexity of the
calculations involved with conducting this by hand,
Dambacher 
 
et al
 
. (2002) formulated an equivalent
method using matrix algebra. They also formulated a
relative scale for weighting the ambiguity of response
predictions that is based on the ratio of the net number
of positive (or negative) cycles to the total number of
cycles.
Using the topological web presented in Fig. 2, we
constructed a signed digraph and associated qualita-
tive community matrix (
 
A
 
) representing the relevant
positive and negative interactions (Fig. 3). In this
model, it is assumed that possums, ship rats and stoats
negatively affect kokako (which, in turn, has a positive
influence on he three predator species) while possums,
ship rats and kokako negatively affect fruit /foliage pro-
duction (from either eating the b ds and flowers o  the
fruits themselves).
From the qualitative communi y matrix, a matrix of
predictions of the direction of the effect on species 
 
i
 
caused by a sustained increase in species 
 
j
 
 (i.e. the net
number and sign of feedback cycles contributing to the
response) was calculated using the matrix algebra
Fig. 3. Signed digraph f  t  o  fo d web and the associated qualitatively specified c mmunity m trix (a). Arrows represent
positive c usal links and closed circles rep sent negative causal links. Closed circles starting and endi g at the same variable
represent self-dampi g (density-dependent) effects. 1, Fruits /foliage; 2, kokako; 3, ship rats; 4, possums; 5, stoats.
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All model simulations were programmed using the free
software p kag  R (R Development Core T am 2004).
Results
LOOP  ANALYSIS
Analysis of the qualitatively specified community matrix
(A) of the kokako food web (Fig. 3) using the adjoint
(°A) and w ighted predictions (W) matrices are given in
Table 2. Susta ned increases in ship rat , pos ums or stoats
were all predicted to result in a decline in the equilibrium
abundance of kokako or, reversing the signs, sustained
decreases in either ship rats, possums or stoats were
predicted to result in an increase in kokako (Table 2).
However, only the prediction for the effect of ship rats
had high sign determinacy (Table 3). Similarly, a decrease
in ship rat abundanc  was pr dicted to result in no
change to possum and stoat abundance. A decrease in
possum abundance was predicted to result in no
change to rat abundance but an increase in stoat
abundance while a decrease in stoat abundance was
predicted to result in no change to rat abundance but a
decrease in possum abundance (Table 2). However,
none of these predictions had a high sign determinacy.
The only other predictions with high sign determinacy
other than self  effects (Wij ≥ 0·5, j ≠ i) were the negative
effects of kokako on fruit /foliage and the apparently
perverse prediction of the negative effect of kokako
abundance on ship rat abundance. This prediction is the
result of one positive cycle (kokako → ship rats) being
mediated by three negative cycles involving indirect
effects (e.g. acting through a decrease in fruit/foliage
and an increase in stoat abundance).
FUZZY  INTERACTION  WEB
We initially ran the FIW ‘null model’ (Table 1) without
any boundary conditions (i.e. no management) to
determine the equilibrium values of each species. To
obtain equilibrium activation levels for primary pro-
ductivity, a logistic activation function (Appendix I)
was used for fruit/foliage and a positive coefficient was
used in the interaction matrix (e11 = +0·4). Following
this ‘bottom up’ tuning, a stable equilibrium for the
null model was achieved (Fig. 4).
Qualitative predictions for the effects of single and
multispecies control of kokako nest-predators indicated
Table 2. Predictions from the adjoint of the qualitative
matrix (°A) of interactions from the kokako food web. Values
are the net number of feedback cycles (positive and negative)
contributing to the response in species i (rows) resulting from
a sustained positive input into species j (columns); e.g. the
predicted response of a sustained increase in ship rats is
predicted to have a negative effect on kokako (i.e. a net total of
two negative feedback cycles)
 
Fruit /
foliage Kokako
Ship 
rats Possums Stoats
Fruit /foliage 4 −4 2 0 2
Kokako −2 3 −2 −1 −1
Ship rats 2 −2 2 0 0
Possums 2 −1 0 1 1
Stoats 0 1 0 −1 1
Table 3. Values of the weighted predictions matrix (W)
indicating the degree of sign determinacy of the predictions
from the adjoint matrix from Table 2. Values are the net number
of  feedback cycles divided by the total number of  cycles
contributing to the particular response. Values greater than
0·5 generally indicate high sign determinacy
 
 
Fruit /
foliage Kokako
Ship 
rats Possums Stoats
Fruit /foliage 0·67 0·67 0·33 0 0·33
Kokako 0·33 1·00 0·50 0·20 0·20
Ship r ts 0·33 0·50 0·50 0 0
Possums 0·25 0·20 0 0·14 0·20
Stoats 0 0·20 0 0·20 0·11
Fig. 4. The equilibrium activation level for the kokako FIW ‘null model’ following tuning and before manipulations. The
equilibrium was reached following the 13th iteration.
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into species j (columns); e.g. the predicted response of a sustained increase in ship rats is predicted to have a negative effect on 
kokako (i.e. a net total of two negative feedback cycles) (adapted from Ramsey & Veltman, 2005) 
 
 
 Moving to the top end of the list, levels (a) and (b) are precise, because they provide precise 
probabilistic values for X. This is in line with scientific practice, where merely containing 
probabilities is not a reason to think of a prediction as imprecise (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). 
Introducing probabilities is a way of specifying uncertainty. The important point is that the 
probabilities themselves are precise, i.e. they are point probabilities. This also goes for (b), 
where the prediction is for a range of values for X. While a range of values is less precise than 
a single value, the range still has a precise probabilistic value attached to it.  
 This leaves level (c), which is the most complicated. Some scientists might classify it as 
precise merely because it includes numerical values for X. If we do not want it to count as fully 
precise then we must determine what makes it different from level (b). The key difference is 
that the probabilities in (c) are themselves imprecise. A probabilistic range, i.e. an interval, is 
less precise than a point prediction, even if the point prediction is for a range of values. That 
is, giving a range of probabilities for a range of values reflects more uncertainty than a point 
prediction for the same range of values. As Parker & Risbey state, this level of imprecision 
(i.e. a range) can also be equivalently expressed as a qualitative level of confidence for a point 
probability.   
 To sum up the discussion in this section, the precise/imprecise distinction should not be 
viewed as dichotomous (at least in the case of predictions), as model output imprecision comes 
in degrees. Therefore, both critiques and defences of imprecise predictions should specify the 
level of imprecision of the prediction in question. In what follows, I will be focusing on 
imprecise model predictions, which are defined as the outputs of models with a certain level of 
imprecision. These are the models whose outputs correspond to levels (c) - (f) in the above list. 
I hope that the discussion so far has shown that this grouping is not arbitrary. It encompasses 
predictions that are the outputs of models, not merely educated guesses, but does not include 
point predictions or predictions with precise probabilities, both of which count as precise 
predictions. Moreover, this grouping includes the most prominent imprecise models used by 
scientists in various fields, and which are subject to the most direct critiques.  
 Finally, I should note once more that while some of these models and their predictions are 
labelled ‘qualitative’ or ‘generic’ by the scientists who employ them, these terms can be 
misleading (see for example, Dambacher et al., 2003; Justus 2006; Levins 1974). Labelling a 
prediction as ‘qualitative’, might intuitively imply a methodology that involves no 
quantification, which is not the case in any of the models and predictions I am defending. Thus, 
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it is best to adopt the more neutral terminology of ‘precise’ (also maximally precise, highly 
precise) and ‘imprecise’ (also relatively imprecise, highly imprecise) throughout the 
discussion. Again, however, I will be using the terms precise and imprecise for the sake of 
brevity; this is not meant to indicate a strict dichotomy. Imprecise predictions are meant to 
encompass various levels of imprecision (levels (c) – (f)), while precise predictions are meant 
to encompass a range of more precise predictions (levels (a) – (b)). In the next two sections, I 
will examine which critiques can legitimately be levelled against these predictions and provide 
defences from the critiques.  
 
3.   The case against Imprecise Predictions 
 
If defining imprecise predictions is not straightforward, then identifying their criticisms is 
even more complicated. The main difficulty is that there are few accounts that actually spell 
out the criticisms in any detail or provide clear arguments against imprecise predictions. 
Unfortunately, this does not mean that the critics represent a minority view, rather it shows that 
the critiques have been widely accepted and entrenched in philosophical and scientific thought, 
so imprecise predictions are nowadays usually just dismissed without much further thought.5 
Yet this is precisely why imprecise predictions merit a closer look. It is important to identify 
the strongest criticisms that can be levelled against them and to examine whether they can be 
overcome.  
I will focus on the two most important criticisms of imprecise predictions: (i) that they 
insufficiently risky and therefore cannot help us test models or choose between them and (ii) 
that they cannot support effective interventions. They are the most important because they 
correspond to the two main functions we expect of any scientific prediction, to be able to test 
models/theories and to help scientists successfully intervene in real-world situations.  
The first criticism addresses the traditional role afforded to prediction. Models or theories 
are often developed in order to explain phenomena or patterns of data, yet the best way we 
have to test them is to make predictions based on the model/theory and see if those predictions 
come out true (Lipton 2005; Douglas 2009). Models/theories that consistently produce accurate 
predictions are considered successful. Moreover, we can compare the ‘track record’ of two or 
more models/theories in order to choose which model to use in a particular context. However, 
                                               
5 The two most important explicit critiques of imprecise predictions are Rosenberg (1989) and Orzack and Sober 
(1993). For implicit criticism/dismissal of imprecise predictions in ecology and economics see (Colander et al., 
2009; Evans, et al., 2012; Gurevitch, et al., 2011; Hayes & Barry, 2007; Houlahan et al., 2017; Kolar & Lodge, 
2002).  
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according to Orzack & Sober (1993), if we only have imprecise predictions, we cannot 
discriminate between two different explanations of a set of data.6  
They point to the use of optimality models in evolutionary biology, which identify the 
optimal ‘evolutionary behaviour’ for a particular context and are used to test the extent to which 
natural selection rather than other evolutionary forces is the cause of a particular trait (a trait 
produced by natural selection is considered optimal) (p. 542). For example, they argue that if 
a model of sex ratios predicted an optimal ratio of 0.95, but an individual produced a sex ratio 
of 0.6, then this would be cause for concern and would prompt us to re-examine the model and 
the data (p. 543). However, if the model predicted the sex ratios less precisely, then the data 
point of 0.6 would not be detected as a discrepancy and we would not be able to tell if this was 
a real “lack of optimality” or a “misunderstanding of the biology such that the fact of optimality 
is not detected” (p. 543). They worry that the predominance of imprecise optimality models 
“has hindered the development of an unbiased assessment of the truth of one of the most 
important and influential hypotheses of evolutionary biology” (p. 543).  
Why are imprecise predictions not good tests of models’ explanations of data? Orzack and 
Sober do not state this explicitly, but their criticism is based on a deeper issue: the notion that 
in order for a prediction to count as a true test of a model or theory, it must be sufficiently risky. 
Risky predictions are those that could turn out to be false, which is why they are considered 
good tests. The less obvious a prediction is, given our current knowledge of the model/data, 
the stronger it is as a test. An example often used in textbooks is Mendeleev’s prediction that 
there were three elements yet to be discovered, with specific physical and chemical properties, 
such as atomic weights, acidity, specific gravity etc., which would fit into in to the gaps of the 
periodic table. This set of predictions is treated as an exemplar of riskiness, because there are 
many ways in which it could turn out to be false: e.g. there could be fewer or more than three 
elements, while each element could have different characteristics than the ones predicted.  
Precision is one way of increasing the riskiness of a prediction.7 For example, we could test 
a model of predation by predicting that the prey population (of, say, bison) will fall from 800 
to 500 individuals (e.g. because of a conservation program, such as the introduction of wolves), 
then rise to 750 individuals (because of the corresponding drop in predator population after the 
initial drop in prey population). We can then observe the population and collect the relevant 
                                               
6 A similar criticism can also be found in Rosenberg’s criticism of generic predictions in economics. He argues 
that Keynesian macroeconomic models (such as the IS-LM) mischaracterized the relationship between 
unemployment and inflation, which was overlooked because of the imprecision of the predictions (1989, p. 56).  
7 The other most common characteristic of riskiness is novelty. A discussion of novelty is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but see (Hitchcock and Sober 2004; Douglas and Magnus 2013).   
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data. If the actual prey population does drop to 500 and then rise to 750, we have good reasons 
to think that the model has latched on to the relevant causal factors of the actual system. If, on 
the other hand, the population does eventually rise, or rises to much more or less than 750 
individuals (say 900 or 500), then this would mean that there is something wrong with our 
model (I am assuming, for the sake of the argument, that we have not made any mistakes in 
the collection, measurement or interpretation of data). Moreover, we can use precise 
predictions to choose between competing models. For example, if we had a second quantitative 
model which that the prey population would fall to 650 individuals, then we would have a clear 
reason to favour of the first model, because the first would be more accurate than the second.  
Contrast this with a model that predicts only that the prey population will fall, if a predator 
population is introduced. This is not a completely trivial or risk-free prediction. It could be 
false if the prey population rose to more than its initial size. However, it would be true whether 
the population fell to 0, 200, 400 or 750 individuals, so it much easier to confirm. This is 
problematic because it doesn’t provide us with a good enough test of our model. A drop in the 
prey population to 200 individuals could be because of a different mechanism than a drop to 
750 individuals, but the imprecise model and its corresponding prediction would not help us 
distinguish between the two cases. Nor would it help us to choose between two imprecise 
models that both predicted a drop in prey population after the introduction of predators.  
The second criticism is the worry that scientists need precise predictions in order to 
accurately anticipate phenomena or changes in real-world systems, so that they can effectively 
intervene to deal with the situation. The idea is that imprecise model predictions are not always 
sufficiently informative for effective interventions.8 There are two ways in which this criticism 
can be understood. The first is as a practical extension of the first criticism. An imprecise model 
prediction might point to a correct trend, yet obscure the actual causes of the phenomenon, so 
an intervention based on that model would be ineffective. Going back to the predation example, 
the population drop in the prey could be caused by a completely different factor, say a parasite. 
This would probably cause a much larger drop in the prey population (e.g. to 200) and would 
not include the subsequent rise (e.g. to 750). As the imprecise prediction does not specify the 
extent of the population drop, we might fail to recognise the true cause of the drop in the prey 
population and intervene ineffectively (i.e. by controlling the predators).  
                                               
8 Rosenberg uses this criticism in his attack on Keynesian macroeconomic models, which he believes led to 
ineffective interventions on the economy (1989, pp 58-59).  
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The second version of the criticism is even more pragmatic. Even if we latch on to the 
accurate mechanism causing the population drop, then the lack of precise information could 
also cause us to intervene ineffectively. For example, a small drop, say to 750 individuals, does 
not usually require an intervention (the population will often bounce back on its own), whereas 
a larger drop, e.g. to 200 individuals, can be much more dangerous and merit an intervention 
if the population is to be conserved. With just the output of the imprecise model, scientists are 
at risk of not realizing that an intervention is necessary if the population drop is large. 
Alternatively, they might spend scarce resources to intervene without it being necessary if the 
population drop is small. 
These are the strongest criticisms of imprecise model predictions, because they address the 
two most important roles any scientific prediction ought to embody. If they cannot be 
overcome, then there is really no reason to invest time, energy and funding on imprecise 
predictions.  
 
4.   Defending Imprecise Predictions 
 
4.1. The Case of the North Island kōkako 
  
 The North Island kōkako is a bird endemic to New Zealand with a beautiful song (Ramsey 
& Veltman, 2005, henceforth R&V). In 1999 the species was reduced to 400 pairs. The cause 
of the kōkako decline was predation. This is not surprising, in itself, but there are three main 
bird predators in New Zealand, the so-called ‘unholy trinity’: rats, possums and stoats. As 
resources were limited, it was important to determine which of these predators to focus on 
primarily, and the extent to which each population needed to be culled. To make matters worse, 
the policy needed to be researched and implemented before the kōkako numbers dropped 
further.  
 R&V used two imprecise models to analyse the dynamics of the kōkako community and 
to predict the effect of interventions on that community for the kōkako population. The first 
model was loop analysis (outlined in section 2) and was used to identify all the dynamic 
relationships between populations in the community, along with their quality (positive, neutral 
or negative). Adding up the number of positive neutral and negative effects reveals the overall 
effect of each population on the others. In this case, loop analysis predicted that the rat 
population had the overall most important effect on the kōkako.  
 The second model was a ‘fuzzy interaction web’ (FIW). FIWs take imprecise information 
on the abundances of populations within an ecological community, i.e. population abundance 
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data that is incomplete or imprecise, and create ‘fuzzy sets’. This is because it is practically 
impossible to determine the exact size of each population, and consequently the precise rates 
of competition and predation within the community. The scientists express this uncertainty 
through ‘fuzziness’ i.e. each element can have partial membership of a set, and/or can belong 
to multiple sets.  
 To clarify, let us start with what the scientists do know. They can measure ‘tracking rates’, 
i.e. the percentage of traps that are full on any given night. They then determine the ‘indexes’ 
of each population i.e. what counts as low, medium or high abundance. This is based on 
comparing the tracking rates with existing data of past tracking rates (in this case the data 
stretched back more than 10 years). For example, in this community, when 20% or above of 
the traps each night are full, this counts as high abundance, whereas an index of below 10% 
represents low abundance. However, as the scientists at no point know the exact size of any 
population, this index is an estimate, hence the intermediate percentages have partial 
membership in high, medium and low abundances (see figure 2). In other words, by fuzzifying 
the membership in each set (high, medium, low), the scientists are incorporating the inherent 
uncertainties of each population size estimate.  
 
Figure 2. Fuzzy set membership functions for linguistic descriptions of species abundances (‘low’, 
‘(mod)erate’, ‘high’) for each of the animal species in the kōkako Fuzzy Interaction Web (reprinted from R&V, 
supplementary materials) 
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 With the indexes in place, the scientists can make predictions about the effect of each 
population on the other populations in the community. Figure 3 summarises the predictions 
yielded by the FIW. It shows that controlling all three populations would have a high effect on 
the kōkako population, however, controlling rats and possums would have a moderate effect 
on the kōkako population. Given the population indexes mentioned above, a moderate effect is 
sufficient for bringing back the kōkako population to acceptable levels, thus the most efficient 
intervention should focus on the rats and possums. More specifically, the FIW predicted that 
the rats need to be kept at a tracking rate of “about 11% or lower” and possums at a tracking 
rate “below about 10%”, so that the kōkako population is maintained at “moderate levels” 
(R&V, p 914).  
 
Figure 3. Fuzzy Interaction Web Predictions: Imprecise predictions of the magnitude of the effect on the 
equilibrium kōkako fledgling rate resulting from sustained single and multispecies control of nest predators from 
the FIW ‘trained’ model.  (reprinted from R&V) 
 
 
 This example reveals two important points about the value of imprecise model predictions. 
The first is that both models are genuinely imprecise (loop analysis corresponds to level d, and 
FIWs correspond to level c in the classification outlined in section 2). At no point do the 
scientists have precise estimations of each population or even precise estimations of what 
percentage of the population should be culled. Instead, they can make comparisons between 
the strength of the effects between the populations of the community and imprecise estimates 
of tracking rates. That is, they do not need to know how large the populations actually are, they 
merely need to know to keep culling until the tracking rates are below a certain percentage.  
 This is actually important practical advantage of imprecise models. A common problem 
in ecology (and other disciplines) is paucity of data: often, the data we want are difficult to 
obtain, or even unavailable. For example, the capture-recapture method is perhaps the most 
widely used sampling method in ecology yet does not work equally well for all 
species/populations. It is not very useful in cases where capture or recapture is difficult, and it 
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that controlling any single species by itself  could not
result in a qualitative increase in the fledging rate for
either the ‘null’ or ‘trained’ models. How ver, ship rat
control resulted in a qualitative decrease in stoat
abundance from ‘mod’ to ‘low’ for both models (Tables 4
and 5). When two predator species were controlled
simultaneously, the combination of both ship rat and
possum contr l was more effec ive than any other com-
bination and was adequate to qualitatively increase the
fledging rate from ‘low’ to ‘high’ (null model) or from
‘low’ to ‘mod’ (trained model). Defuzzification of the
fuzzy set membership functions produced predictions
for the kokako fledging rate between 1·5 and 2·6 chicks
female−1 year−1 for the null model and between 0·9 and
2·2 chicks female−1 year−1 for the trained model when
the corresponding ship rat tracking rate was reduced
to a defuzzified 11% and the possum trap-catch to a
defuzzified 4% (Fig. 5).
Simultaneous control of all three nest predators to
low levels resulted in predicted fledging rates of ‘high’
for both the ‘null’ and trained models (Table 5). The
predictions for the defuzzifed values for the fledging
rate when all nest predators were controlled to ‘low’
levels ranged from 2·3 to 3 chicks female−1 years−1 for
the null model and 1·3–2·7 chicks female−1 years−1 for
the trained model (Fig. 6).
Discussion
We have demonstrated two qualitative approaches
for predicting the dynamics of simple to moderately
complex communities. The first approach using the
qualitative community matrix approach (loop ana-
lysi ) of Dambacher et al. (2002) is suitable if  only the
direction of the effects of perturbations is required, not
their magnitude. Although it is tempting to interpret
the values of the adjoint of the negative community
matrix as representing the relative strength of system
response, Dambacher et al. (2003) caution against this
interpretation as it is easily eroded by weak interactions
and variation in interaction strength. Hence it is pru-
dent to consider the adjoint matrix as providing
predictions of response sign only. However, the strength
of  this approach is in its generality and its ability to
address the often-complex effects that dynamic feed-
back between community members may contribute to
perturbation responses (Dambacher et al. 2002).
The second approach, fuzzy interaction webs (FIW),
used fuzzy logic in the framework of a fuzzy cognitive
map. In addition to being able to incorporate informa-
tion on species i teractions, the other advantage of the
FIW approach over loop analysis is that it can make
predictions about multiple simultaneous perturbations.
Fuzzy logic has been used previously as a tool to process
expert knowledge or imprecise relationships in ecolo-
gical settings (e.g. Salski 1992). Fuzzy sets allow models
to be constructed using uncertain knowledge and imprecise
data that can make predictions using linguistic state-
ments describing ecosystem effects or by integrating fuzzy
set membership functions to give a ‘crisp’ output. The
crisp or defuzzified output is equivalent to the statistical
expectation of  the fuzzy membership functions.
Table 4. Qualitative predictions of the magnitude of the effect on the equilibrium kokako fledging rate and abundance of nest
predator species resulting from sustained si gle and multispecies co trol of nest predators from the FIW ‘null’ model
 
 
Species controlled
Population 
abundance 
of ra s
Population
abundance 
of pos ums
Population 
abundance 
of stoats
Kokako 
fledging 
rate
Rats Low Mod Low Low
Possums Mod Low High Low
Stoats Mod Mod Low Low
Rats and possums Low Low Mod High
Rats and stoats Low Mod Low Low
Possums and stoats Mod Low Low Low
All three Low Low Low High
Table 5. Qualitative predictions of the magnitude of the effect on the equilibrium kokako fledging rate resulting from sustained
single and multispecies control of nest predators from the FIW ‘trained’ model
 
 
Species controlled
Population 
abundance 
of rats
Population 
abundance 
of possums
Population 
abundance 
of stoats
Kokako 
fledging 
rate
Rats Low Mod Low Low
Possums Mod Low Mod Low
Stoats Mod Mod Low Low
Rats and possums Low Low Mod Mod
Rats and stoats Low Mod Low Low
Possums and stoats Mod Low Low Low
All three Low Low Low High
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can result in biased samples. For instance, in some fish species, capture methods are biased 
towards larger fish, skewing demographic information (Pine et al. 2003).  
 In cases like these, imprecise rather than highly precise models may be superior. There 
have been studies that compare the success rates of imprecise and highly precise predictions in 
a number of contexts. Precise models tend to be much more susceptible to poor, biased or 
patchy data, precisely because of their finely specified variables. For example, (Novak et al. 
2011) found that even if there is observational and experimental data on particular species 
within the ecosystem but insufficient data on the indirect effects of each interaction on other 
populations within the ecosystem or other dynamics, the predictive accuracy of highly precise 
models dwindles rapidly (e.g. to about the level of flipping a coin). In addition, the process of 
transforming imprecise data to precise variables for highly precise models is generally ill-
advised, because while it results in model outputs that are precise numbers, they are often 
wildly inaccurate (e.g. population in the future is much larger/smaller than the model predicts), 
or not particularly illuminating (e.g. the sign (+/-) of the number can vary, which means that 
we cannot be sure that the interaction is positive or negative) (Dambacher, Li, and Rossignol 
2003).  
 The second point directly addresses the issue of riskiness and model choice. A non-risky 
prediction is that all predator populations have negative effects on the kōkako. This is quite 
intuitive. Moreover, it would not be falsified if culling any one, two or all three predator 
populations had the desired effect on the kōkako. However, neither loop analysis nor the FIWs 
made that prediction. As we saw, in both cases the models predicted that culling all three 
predators would have a positive effect on the kōkako population, yet they both made the much 
riskier prediction that this intervention was unnecessary, and that the intervention could focus 
on just the rat population (loop analysis) or the rat and possum population (FIW).  
 In fact, as the two models made different predictions, this gives us an opportunity to test 
each model. This is precisely what the scientists did in their paper, revealing an important flaw 
in loop analysis that could be overcome with the FIW. This is because in loop analysis, the 
(strong) negative feedback cycle (between rats and stoats) was counteracted by 2 (weak) 
positive feedback cycles. As loop analysis cannot distinguish between feedback cycle 
strengths, the prediction of the effect was lost. In contrast, the FIW examined the effect of each 
pair of predators on the kōkako population. Thus, it predicted that the stoat population is 
affected by the rat population, hence a reduction in the rat population would lead to a reduction 
in the stoat population. This means that intervening on the rat population renders intervention 
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on the stoat population unnecessary, but also controlling the possum population would make 
the intervention more successful.  
 I should note that ecologists working with imprecise model predictions are remarkably 
careful in using and testing their models. As stated above, Novak et al. (2011) compared the 
predictive success of imprecise and highly precise models, showing the advantages and 
limitations of each. R&V were aware of the limitations of loop analysis, hence used a second 
model to test the data. Furthermore, they actually examined the possibility of using highly 
precise models for the kōkako community and showed that the available data on the estimates 
of interaction strengths did not conform to the parameters required by highly precise models, 
so that they resulted in wildly inaccurate results (p. 906).   
 Moving to the second criticism, did these predictions support effective interventions? They 
did. The case of the kōkako is actually a heartening success story of interventionist 
conservation. Today, there are about 1600 pairs dispersed over 22 different sites. 10 of these 
populations have been recovered and an additional 12 have been newly established. The plans 
continue in the future, with the goal being to increase the population to 3000 pairs by 2025 
(New Zealand Department of Conservation 2017).  
 As it turns out, we also know that the model predictions I have discussed were actually 
used in the intervention on the kōkako and were instrumental in saving the population from 
extinction. One of the paper’s authors (Veltman), was based at the Science and Research Unit 
of the New Zealand Department of Conservation, which was in charge of the kōkako 
conservation project. In addition, other papers she (co)authored include research on direct and 
indirect effects of pest (rat, stoat and possum) control on ecological communities (Tompkins 
and Veltman 2006). This work was part of a larger project within the Department of 
Conservation, contributing to a paper on imprecise models for deer control (also a pest in New 
Zealand) (Ramsey et al. 2012). In addition, subsequent publications of the Department of 
Conservation incorporate the research and recommendations from papers by these scientists 
(see for example Brown, Elliott, and Kemp 2015).  
 To sum up, the case of the north Island kōkako provides us with example of imprecise 
model predictions that were both risky and supported effective interventions. Yet the kōkako 
case required immediate intervention and was constrained by paucity of data. How often do 
these types of situations come about? In other words, what is the scope of imprecise model 
predictions in scientific practice? I will address this worry in the next section.  
 
4.2. The Role of Imprecise Model Predictions in Scientific Practice. 
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What exactly is the role of imprecise model predictions in scientific practice? When should 
scientists prefer models with imprecise predictions over models with precise predictions? My 
aim in this section is not to claim that imprecise predictions are always preferable to maximally 
precise ones. That claim would be clearly false. However, I am claiming that there are some 
contexts in which imprecise predictions are consistently preferable. The most comprehensive 
account of the context for imprecise predictions can be found in the work of Richard Levins. 
A substantial part of his work was geared towards creating the conceptual space and providing 
support for qualitative analysis and imprecise modelling (Justus 2006). His seminal paper on 
different strategies for model-building (Levins, 1966) can be understood, in part, as providing 
a theoretical argument for model diversity, which includes the motivation for constructing 
imprecise models (Weisberg 2006).  
 This motivation is key to understanding the importance of imprecise predictions for 
scientific practice. Levins famously pointed out that systems in the natural world are very 
complex (i.e. made up of many interacting parts), and that this complexity cannot be 
incorporated in our models, in its entirety. We aim to maximize the quality of our models by 
making them as precise, realistic and general as possible, yet complexity results in a tradeoff 
between these desiderata. Only two of the three desiderata can be maximized in each model, 
thus giving rise to three strategies for model building (each sacrificing one desideratum and 
maximizing the other two) and three corresponding types of models.  
 In this context, imprecise modelling, which produces imprecise predictions as its output, 
is one of three legitimate strategies for model-building (type III). That is, by sacrificing 
precision, imprecise models are able to maximize the other two desiderata. First, by sacrificing 
precision instead of realism they are said to contain idealizations of specificity rather than 
idealizations of veracity (Justus 2006, 659). That is, imprecise models represent systems 
veridically, yet are simplified in the sense that particular properties are represented with low 
degrees of specificity. For example, the FIW included all populations in the community, the 
resources (fruit and foliage) and all the interactions between each population, i.e. not just the 
effect of each predator on the kōkako. The simplification here was that no population size was 
represented precisely.  
 In contrast, maximally precise models (usually type I, sacrificing realism for generality 
and precision) employ different methods of simplification, i.e. making unrealistic assumptions 
and/or omitting causal factors altogether. For example, the most common alternative to 
imprecise models for community interactions is a version of the Lotka-Volterra predation 
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model.9 This model does not include the resources (fruit and foliage), and simplifies the 
interactions between each population, i.e. it does not separately identify the interactions 
between each population in the community  (see footnote 7, R&V p. 906 and Dambacher et al. 
2003 for a full explanation of the details). Not all factors make it into the model and many that 
do are simplified, decreasing the ‘veracity’ of the model. The problem is that this type of 
idealization often mischaracterizes salient features of systems, resulting in inaccurate 
explanations and/or predictions (Justus 2005, 2006). In the above example, the idealizations of 
veracity result in the models not being able to predict the effects of large perturbations or non-
linear interactions, which are very common in real communities (R&V p. 906, Dambacher et 
al. 2003 p. 80).   
 Second, allowing for imprecision results in higher levels of generality, i.e. the models are 
not tied to a particular system, but applicable to many (different) systems. Generalizing results 
can be very useful, because it allows scientists to make connections (comparisons, contrasts) 
across systems. In some cases, general models can pave the way to unifying explanations that 
subsume a large number of phenomena (Weisberg 2006). The problem in complex systems, is 
that generality is usually either abandoned (type II models) or achieved at the expense of 
realism (type I models), models that are applicable widely but whose explanations and 
predictions are often inaccurate (Elliott-Graves 2018). In contrast, by sacrificing precision, 
ecologists such as Levins were able to construct models that were widely applicable to many 
different populations in different environments, but also realistic, incorporating many of the 
salient variables for each population and thus minimizing the risk of inaccuracies.  
 The tradeoff account provides the basic insight of how complexity10 causes difficulties 
studying ecological systems but does not adequately capture the extent of these difficulties. 
First, many ecological models incorporate complexity (type II models). Second, scientists in 
other fields that study complex systems, such as physics and chemistry, do not seem to face 
such extensive tradeoffs (Justus 2005 in Matthewson 2011). A Boeing 747 is a complex entity, 
                                               
9 The version presented in R &V is a multi-species interaction model, described by the following equation dNi/dt 
= fi(N) i = 1, 2, …, s, where Ni is the density of species i, N is the vector of s species densities (N1, N2, …, Ns), and 
fi is the function describing the growth rate of species i. The partial derivative of fi with respect to species j at 
equilibrium growth rates yields aij = ¶fi/¶Nj. Based on this, the scientists construct a community matrix to make 
predictions based on a sustained increase or decrease of any of the community’s members (all the matrix’s 
elements are represented together the term aij, so any change in one of the community members reflects a change 
in aij) (p. 906).  
10 In this context (and literature), complexity is usually understood to mean the following: a system is complex 
when it has many interacting parts (Elliott-Graves 2018; Levins 1966; Matthewson & Weisberg 2009; 
Matthewson, 2011). Systems are also sometimes described as complex when they exhibit emergent behaviours 
(Matthewson, 2011).        
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yet once we have knowledge of how one Boeing 747 works, we can generalize to other cases 
and make accurate predictions about a range of flight trajectories etc. (Matthewson 2011).  
 The answer lies in another feature that magnifies the tradeoff between generality realism 
and precision. Causal heterogeneity occurs when the parts that make up a system are 
themselves diverse (Elliott-Graves 2018).11 That is, ecosystems or economies are not like 
aeroplanes; none is identical to the others. This means that generalising across systems is often 
difficult or even impossible, as knowledge of what happens in one system does not necessarily 
apply to other systems, even if they seem similar at first glance. This is precisely what has 
happened in many cases of simple, precise and general models (type I) in ecology, where a 
model that works for one system produces inaccurate predictions in other systems. For 
example, general models of competition, that apply well to animal populations often yield 
inaccurate predictions for plant populations (Berger et al. 2008). In contrast, imprecise models 
can incorporate a much larger number of causal factors, without being tied to a particular 
system, because outputs are specified imprecisely. For example, a loop analysis model for a 
community of n species will be applicable to all communities of n species, irrespective of their 
geographical location, and will include all interactions between populations and resources. 
Thus, it will capture every single relevant interaction and its quality (positive, neutral or 
negative), though it will not specify its magnitude.   
 This is especially pertinent in the case of prediction because generalizations across time 
are also often unwarranted (Elliott-Graves 2018). Even if scientists have adequate knowledge 
of the functioning of a system at a particular time, the existence of dynamics, feedback, 
threshold effects etc. mean that this knowledge might not be projectable into the future. For 
example, current knowledge of how insects deal with the cold during wintertime might not 
result in accurate predictions of native and invasive insect abundances in the light of climate 
change (Marshall and Sinclair 2012; Kaunisto, Ferguson, and Sinclair 2016).  
 To sum up the argument so far, sacrificing realism in complex heterogeneous systems is 
dangerous, because we need sufficient causal information in order to make accurate 
predictions. The causal heterogeneity here matters more than the complexity. As stated above, 
models that sacrifice realism leave out causal factors, and focus on a small subset of them. This 
is not a problem in complex systems if the factors that remain in the model are the relevant 
causal factors whereas the factors left out are mere details. The problem in causally 
                                               
11 A full examination of causal heterogeneity and all its effects on scientific practice is beyond the scope of this 
paper but can be found in (Elliott-Graves 2018).  
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heterogeneous systems is that they differ in terms of causes. Thus, any time a factor is left out, 
it has a much higher chance of being relevant. In these types of cases, imprecise model 
predictions have a higher chance of providing accurate predictions, hence should preferred, or 
at the very least, genuinely considered.  
 Finally, even if this argument is persuasive within the context described, a critic of 
imprecise predictions can still maintain that this context is an example of non-ideal or immature 
science. For example, Rosenberg allowed that imprecise predictions in economics can be 
useful in certain cases, though he maintained that they should be superseded by more precise 
predictions whenever and wherever possible. If a science is to be considered fully mature, then 
scientists should do whatever it takes to get closer to the ideal of maximal precision. The 
implication is that the difficulties leading to the use of imprecise models are practical, such as 
lack of data, poor quality data, working under time constraints (all of which apply to the kōkako 
case). But, the argument goes, with time, scientists will build more extensive data sets and get 
better knowledge of the systems they are investigating so that maximally precise predictions 
will be possible and imprecise predictions superfluous. Therefore, scientists should not become 
complacent and accept that imprecise predictions are good enough, even if they occasionally 
are useful. 
 The problem with this criticism is that it is based on a misunderstanding. Complexity and 
causal heterogeneity are not artefacts of our scientific methods, but intrinsic factors of many 
systems under investigation. Moreover, they are factors that cannot be overcome, even as 
science progresses. Even if we acquire more data and gain a better understanding of each 
system we study, this does not mean that the same causal factors will be relevant in other 
systems or at other times. This may seem far from our picture of an ‘ideal’ science, but it does 
mean that we can shoehorn these systems into the pre-existing ideal. As we have seen, ignoring 
or reducing complexity and causal heterogeneity in our models often makes our scientific 
investigations worse, as the subsequent predictions are inaccurate. Yet we have an alternative 
option for these cases, namely sacrificing precision with imprecise models. As Levins and 
others have shown, this is a legitimate option, which is underutilized. It is perhaps this 
preoccupation with a singular conception of an ‘ideal science’ that has led us to overlook the 
contexts in which imprecise predictions are useful and thus undervalue them. 
 
5.   Conclusion 
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 Imprecise predictions are undervalued in philosophy of science, as there is some confusion 
about how they should be defined, and because they are mistakenly thought to be opaque, 
mathematically suspect or useless. I have shown that a large and important subset of imprecise 
predictions are not subject to these criticisms and in certain contexts they outperform precise 
predictions. While most of the examples of this analysis were from ecology, a discipline where 
imprecise predictions have been used and evaluated more thoroughly, the classification and 
defence of imprecise predictions can be applied to other disciplines that face similar issues of 
uncertainty and causal heterogeneity, such as economics and climate science.   
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